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 The ISA 700 Auditor’s Report and the Audit Expectation Gap –  
Do Explanations Matter? 
 
ABSTRACT: In this paper we test the effectiveness of explanations as mandated by 
the revised ISA 700 auditor‟s report in reducing the audit expectation gap. German 
auditors and financial statement users participated in an experiment where they read a 
summary of a firm‟s financial statements and an auditor‟s report, the latter of which 
we manipulated as being the auditor‟s report including the explanations as mandated 
by ISA 700 versus a mere audit opinion-only version. We elicited participants‟ 
perceptions about auditor versus management responsibilities and financial statement 
reliability. 
We find strong evidence for a persistent expectation gap with respect to the 
auditor‟s responsibilities. Meanwhile, auditors and users reach a reasonable belief 
consensus regarding management‟s responsibilities and financial statement reliability. 
Most notably, explanations of the ISA 700 auditor‟s report do not result in a smaller 
expectation gap. Our findings suggest that the mere audit opinion may signal 
sufficient relevant information to users. 
 
Key words: Audit expectation gap, auditors, financial statement users, financial 
analysts, students, auditor‟s report, responsibility perceptions, reliability perceptions. 
 
SUMMARY: In response to repeated observations of an audit expectation gap 
between financial statement users and the audit profession, the International 
Accounting and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) released a revision of the 
International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 700, the standard on the auditor‟s report, 
which is effective for reports dated on or after December 31
st
, 2006. The revision was 
undertaken in order to improve users‟ understanding of an audit and to align users‟ 
expectations with the actual responsibilities of the auditor and management as well as 
the reliability of audited financial statements (IFAC, 2008). This revision of ISA 700 
primarily featured the inclusion in the report of explanations of auditor versus 
management responsibilities and of the nature, scope, and procedures of the audit. 
This raises the question whether such explanations do in fact result in any smaller 
expectation gap than when no further explanations are offered in the report. Hence, 
 the purpose of this paper is (1) to determine the current state of the expectation gap 
under the revised ISA 700 auditor‟s report, and (2) to test whether the presence versus 
absence of explanations in the auditor‟s report as mandated by the revised ISA 700 
results in a smaller expectation gap. 
We report the results of an experiment in which experienced German auditors 
and financial statement users (i.e., financial analysts and business students) read a 
brief company description, a summary of the firm‟s financial statements, and an 
auditor‟s report, the latter of which we manipulated as being either the auditor‟s report 
including the explanations as mandated by the revised ISA 700 or a mere audit 
opinion-only version. Participants then responded to questions related to the perceived 
responsibility of the auditor versus management for the financial statements and 
questions about the reliability of the audited financial statements. 
We find strong evidence for a persistent audit expectation gap between 
auditors and financial statement users under the revised ISA 700 auditor‟s report with 
respect to the auditor‟s responsibilities. Meanwhile, auditors and users reach a 
reasonable belief consensus regarding management‟s responsibilities and financial 
statement reliability. Most notably, the explanations of the ISA 700 auditor‟s report of 
auditor versus management responsibilities and of the nature, scope, and procedures 
of the audit do not result in a smaller expectation gap. Our findings suggest that the 
mere audit opinion may already signal sufficient relevant information to financial 
statement users. 
Overall, while the fact that an audit expectation gap still exists under the new 
ISA 700 auditor‟s report is in line with our expectations, it is disconcerting that the 
rather detailed explanations of auditor versus management responsibilities do not 
favourably affect the gap. This observation may indicate that the explanations would 
need to be formulated more explicitly and clearly, or even that users‟ perceptions are 
simply not malleable by additional information and explanations in the auditor‟s 
report. 
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The ISA 700 Auditor’s Report and the Audit Expectation Gap –  
Do Explanations Matter? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The issuance of an unqualified audit opinion implies that the auditor believes that the 
financial statements give a true and fair view in accordance with the applicable 
financial reporting framework (IFAC, 2008). Prior research demonstrates that 
financial statement users (such as bankers, investors, and financial analysts) often 
associate an absolute level of assurance when they read such messages, potentially 
resulting in naïve or unreasonable expectations (e.g., Epstein & Geiger, 1994). 
However, in reality, the auditor merely provides a reasonable level of assurance (e.g., 
Hasan et al., 2005), as inherent audit limitations prevent the auditor from achieving 
absolute assurance (Gay et al., 1998). Furthermore, financial statement users 
(henceforth called „users‟) often assume audits to have a broader scope than they 
actually have. For example, users may erroneously associate audits with an approval 
of management adequacy, a guarantee of the absence of fraud, and a recommendation 
to invest in the respective firm (Frank et al., 2001). Prior studies (e.g., Bailey et al., 
1983; Nair & Rittenberg, 1987; Anderson et al., 1998) have also found that users 
attribute disproportionate responsibility toward auditors, whereas in reality, 
management (rather than the auditor) is primarily responsible for the adequacy of the 
financial statements. These and other differences between what users expect from the 
auditor and what the auditor actually provides have become known as the audit 
expectation gap.
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In response to this problem, the International Accounting and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) released a revision of the International Standard on 
Auditing (ISA) 700, the standard on the auditor‟s report, which is effective for reports 
dated on or after December 31
st
, 2006. With this revision, the IAASB mandates a new 
wording for the auditor‟s report that includes explicit explanations of the 
responsibilities of management and the auditor and of the nature, scope, and 
procedures of the audit (IAASB, 2004). The first objective of our study is to 
empirically assess the current state of the expectation gap in Germany given the 
                                               
1 For conceptual inquiry into the expectation gap see Dennis (2010b); for a critical debate on the 
effectiveness of the audit function given the presence of an expectation gap see Humphrey and Owen 
(2000). 
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revised ISA 700 auditor‟s report. To this end, users (financial analysts as sophisticated 
users and business students as unsophisticated users) and experienced auditors were 
asked to read an unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s report in its revised form and to 
respond to questions about the responsibilities of the auditor and management and the 
reliability of the audited financial statements. 
The revised ISA 700 requires the auditor‟s report to provide explicit 
explanations of the auditor‟s versus management‟s responsibilities, along with an 
explanation of the nature, scope, and procedures of the audit. The revision was 
undertaken in order to improve users‟ understanding of an audit and to align users‟ 
expectations with the actual responsibilities of the auditor and management as well as 
the reliability of audited financial statements (IFAC, 2008).
2
 This recent revision of 
ISA 700 raises the question whether financial statement users pay attention to such 
explanations and whether these explanations do in fact result in a smaller audit 
expectation gap as compared to the absence of such explanations in the report. Prior 
research partly suggests that specific wording in the auditor‟s report may lead to a 
better understanding of the scope, nature and significance of audit procedures (e.g., 
Bailey et al., 1983; Manson & Zaman, 2001; Chong & Pflugrath, 2008), but there is 
also evidence suggesting only moderate, undesired, or even no effect at all (e.g., 
Humphrey et al. 1992; Brown et al. 1993; Monroe & Woodliff 1994; Kneer et al. 
1996; Schelluch 1996; Chong & Pflugrath 2008; Humphrey et al. 2009). Hence, the 
second purpose of the current study is to provide empirical evidence on whether the 
presence of explanations in the auditor‟s report as mandated by the revised ISA 700 
results in a smaller expectation gap as compared to the absence of such explanations 
in the report. We use the “strongest” experimental manipulation possible, which 
compares perceptions formed on the basis of the complete auditor‟s report that 
includes the explanations as mandated by the revised ISA 700 on the one hand versus 
a version without any further explanations (i.e., an opinion-only version) on the other. 
A reduced gap in expectations on the basis of the complete auditor‟s report would 
indicate a positive effect of the presence of explanations that accompany the audit 
                                               
2
 All European Union (EU) member states are required to replace their existing national auditor‟s 
reports with the new format as soon as the European Commission adopts an international auditing 
standard that covers the same subject matter as a national standard (European Parliament and Council, 
2006). In Germany, the implementation of the ISA 700 into IDW PS 400 is currently being undertaken. 
For the purposes of this study, the unpublished draft version of the German translation of the ISA 700 
was used, which was kindly provided by the Institute of German Auditors (IDW). 
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opinion in the revised ISA 700 auditor‟s report. In contrast, an unchanged gap would 
indicate that the explanations beyond the audit opinion are ineffective, possibly 
suggesting that the mere audit opinion might signal sufficient relevant information to 
users. 
The results of our experiment among experienced German auditors and users 
with varying levels of sophistication provide strong evidence for a persistent audit 
expectation gap under the revised ISA 700 auditor‟s report in some areas (auditors‟ 
responsibilities), while auditors and users reach a reasonable belief consensus with 
respect to other areas (management‟s responsibilities and financial statement 
reliability). Notably, the explanations of the ISA 700 auditor‟s report do not have an 
effect on the gap between auditors‟ and users‟ expectations and perceptions. 
Our findings are important for at least the following reasons. First, to our 
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the expectation gap under the revised 
ISA 700 in a European country. Prior expectation gap research has largely focused on 
Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US, UK, New Zealand, and Australia (e.g., Gay et 
al., 1997; 1998; Dewing & Russell, 2002; Kirk, 2006; Chong & Pflugrath, 2008) and 
Asian countries such as Singapore, China, Bangladesh, and Lebanon (e.g., Best et al., 
2001; Lin & Chen, 2004; Sidani, 2007; Siddiqui et al., 2009).
3
 Second, we inquired 
among a substantial range of different groups dealing with financial statements and 
audit opinions, including experienced auditors, financial analysts as sophisticated 
users, and business students as unsophisticated or “naïve” users. This approach 
allowed us to capture the impact of different levels of user expertise and, thus, to 
investigate the expectation gap in a differentiated way. Third, in light of rather mixed 
prior evidence, our findings provide insight into whether financial statement users pay 
attention to explicit explanations of auditor versus management responsibilities and of 
the nature, scope, and procedures of the audit included in the report, and whether the 
presence (versus absence) of such explanations results in a smaller expectation gap. 
To our knowledge, we are the first to investigate such an effect based on the revised 
ISA 700. 
                                               
3 Spanish evidence on the usefulness of the auditor‟s report to make investment and lending decisions 
is provided by Duréndez Gómez-Guillamón (2003). Instead of investigating the persistence of the audit 
expectation gap after an unqualified auditor‟s report, he compares the effect of different audit opinions 
(i.e., clean, qualified, adverse or disclaimer). 
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This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research method, the results are 
presented in section 4, and section 5 provides a summary and discussion of the results. 
2. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
2.1 Persistence of the audit expectation gap (H1) 
One of the first studies on the expectation gap was conducted by Libby (1979), who 
investigated bankers‟ and auditors‟ perceptions of the message communicated by the 
auditor‟s report. Libby found that the perceptions of both groups were relatively 
similar to the intended communication. In contrast, Nair & Rittenberg (1987) 
observed that bankers placed greater responsibility for the completeness and accuracy 
of the financial statements on auditors and less responsibility on management than 
CPAs did. Houghton (1987) compared shareholders‟ and accountants‟ perceptions of 
the phrase “true and fair view” and found significant differences between the two 
groups. 
Lowe (1994) was the first researcher to compare perception differences 
between auditors and judges. Lowe found a large divergence in perceptions regarding 
their expectations of the auditing profession. Similarly, Frank et al. (2001) compared 
auditors‟, accounting students‟, and jurors‟ attitudes toward the accounting profession. 
A large difference in perceptions existed between auditors and jurors, whereas 
accounting student responses were very similar to auditor responses. Despite efforts 
by the accounting profession to explicitly differentiate management‟s responsibilities 
for the financial statements from the auditor‟s role in expressing an opinion, jurors 
ascribed greater responsibility to auditors. Studying perceptions related to various 
dimensions of the attest function, McEnroe & Martens (2001) found that investors 
had higher expectations for various facets and assurances of the audit, compared to 
auditors. Reckers et al. (2007) examined the attitudes of judges, law students, MBA 
students, and auditors toward the public accounting profession over time and found 
that auditors‟ attitudes were more favourable than those of the other three groups. 
More recently, Butler et al. (2010) investigated auditors‟ and investors‟ perceptions of 
the intended meanings of key terms used to define auditors‟ responsibilities. They 
found differences between auditors and investors, indicating an expectation gap. 
Non-US evidence also suggests the existence of an expectation gap. For 
example, Best et al. (2001) found evidence of a wide audit expectation gap among 
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auditors, bankers, and investors in Singapore concerning several areas of auditor 
responsibility. Comparing perceptions of accountants, corporate finance directors, 
investments analysts, bank lending officers, and financial journalists from the UK, 
Humphrey et al. (1993) demonstrated the existence of an expectation gap in a variety 
of aspects, in the nature of the audit function and the perceived performance of 
auditors. Research from Australia and New Zealand also supports these findings 
(Porter, 1993; Gay et al., 1997; 1998). A somewhat different research approach was 
used by Öhman et al. (2006) in a study of Swedish auditors‟ practices. They found 
that auditors devoted more resources to areas that were easily verified and fewer 
resources to areas perceived to be of importance to primary stakeholders. 
In conclusion, the expectation gap appears to be a persistent phenomenon 
across time and national borders, despite several institutional changes implemented 
over the last several decades. Given these findings, we expect that the likelihood of 
the revised ISA 700 auditor‟s report to narrow the expectation gap will be rather 
limited. Therefore, we hypothesize that users will still ascribe relatively more 
responsibility to the auditor as compared to auditors themselves, even when they are 
exposed to the revised version of an unqualified ISA 700 report. While auditors are 
knowledgeable about their actual role of merely providing assurance on financial 
statements for which management is primarily responsible, prior research confirms 
that users may have unrealistic expectations about the auditor‟s task and 
responsibilities relative to the responsibilities of management. Therefore, we expect 
that users‟ responsibility ascriptions toward management will be relatively lower 
compared to the responsibility ascriptions of auditors. Furthermore, because auditors 
as compared to users are better aware of the inherent limitations of an audit and an 
unqualified auditor‟s report, we expect that they ascribe less reliability to audited 
financial statements than do users. 
H1a: Users (i.e., students and financial analysts) of financial statements with 
an unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s report ascribe relatively more responsibility 
for the financial statements to the auditor than auditors do. 
H1b: Users (i.e., students and financial analysts) of financial statements with 
an unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s report ascribe relatively less responsibility 
for the financial statements to management than auditors do. 
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H1c: Users (i.e., students and financial analysts) of financial statements with 
an unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s report ascribe relatively more reliability to 
the underlying financial statements than auditors do. 
2.2 Effect of users’ sophistication on the audit expectation gap (H2) 
Prior literature on the auditor‟s report has involved participants with different 
sophistication (i.e., experience and knowledge levels) in the area of financial reporting 
(e.g., bankers, jurors, and students). Overall, research has found that more 
knowledgeable users place less responsibility on auditors than less knowledgeable 
users. These results indicate differences in the size of the expectation gap, depending 
on the experience and knowledge of potential users (e.g., Bailey et al., 1983; 
Humphrey et al., 1993; Manson & Zaman, 2001). Similarly, Monroe & Woodliff 
(1993) studied the influence of education on the expectation gap. They surveyed 
auditors and undergraduate students, who were either uneducated or educated in 
auditing. There were fewer differences between the auditors and the educated students 
in comparison to the uneducated students, suggesting an education effect on the 
expectation gap. Similarly, Gay et al. (1997) reported that users with considerable 
business experience had more moderate expectations of auditors‟ responsibilities and 
perceptions that were closer to those of the auditing profession when compared to less 
experienced users. In contrast, Gramling et al. (1996) found no evidence of an 
education effect (completion of an undergraduate auditing course) on the audit 
expectation gap between students and auditors. 
Another set of studies measured the effect of knowledge or education on the 
audit expectation gap by means of experimental manipulation, e.g., by offering extra 
educational materials to a subsample of users. Such reading material helped educating 
Malaysian users and corrected some misconceptions related to the audit expectation 
gap (Fadzly & Ahmad, 2004). Similarly, evidence from Bangladesh suggests that 
audit education significantly reduces the audit expectation gap as it relates to financial 
statement reliability (Siddiqui et al., 2009). 
Because most prior research finds experience and knowledge effects on the 
size of the expectation gap, we divided our sample of financial statement users into 
financial analysts and students, in order to control for this effect and determine 
whether it holds for the revised ISA 700 auditor‟s report. Financial analysts are 
specialized in financial statement analysis and company data interpretations. Given 
7 
their comprehensive practical experience with audited financial statements, they 
should at least have a moderately sophisticated knowledge of the implications of an 
auditor‟s report. Students were chosen to represent the individual unsophisticated 
investor, who has less practical experience with financial statements and auditor‟s 
reports. We selected students from business and economics programs, who have not 
specialized in the area of auditing, because they are somewhat familiar with financial 
statements but do not have detailed formal knowledge about auditing and auditor‟s 
reports (as should be the case with typical unsophisticated investors in real-world 
markets). Our second hypothesis is stated in three parts as follows: 
H2a: The difference in perceptions of the unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s 
report between unsophisticated users (students) and auditors is relatively 
greater compared to the difference between sophisticated users (financial 
analysts) and auditors regarding the extent to which responsibility for the 
financial statements is ascribed to the auditor. 
H2b: The difference in perceptions of the unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s 
report between unsophisticated users (students) and auditors is relatively 
greater compared to the difference between sophisticated users (financial 
analysts) and auditors regarding the extent to which responsibility for the 
financial statements is ascribed to management. 
H2c: The difference in perceptions of the unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s 
report between unsophisticated users (students) and auditors is relatively 
greater compared to the difference between sophisticated users (financial 
analysts) and auditors regarding the extent to which reliability is ascribed to 
audited financial statements. 
2.3 Effect of explanations on the audit expectation gap (RQ1) 
Prior research has examined the effect of wording differences in the auditor‟s report 
on the expectation gap. While one stream of research explores the alterations in 
readers‟ perceptions after a revision of the relevant auditor‟s report standard (e.g., 
Bailey et al., 1983), a second stream addresses the effect of different types of 
auditor‟s reports on readers‟ perceptions (e.g., Holt & Moizer, 1990). A third stream 
investigates the impact of additional information provided to the reader, such as 
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comparing longer versus shorter auditor‟s reports (e.g., Miller et al., 1993; Humphrey 
et al., 1992; 2009). 
Early research by Bailey et al. (1983) showed that the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants‟ (AICPA) proposed wording changes shifted readers‟ 
perceptions of the responsibility for financial statements from the auditor toward 
management in the desired way. Similarly, the new Statement on Auditing Standards 
(SAS) no. 58 auditor‟s report led to an increase in understandability regarding the 
purposes of the audit and the responsibility of management for the financial 
statements (Kelly & Mohrweis, 1989). Miller et al. (1993) compared bank loan 
officers‟ perceptions of a new auditor‟s report based on SAS no. 58 and found that 
loan officers who read the new auditor‟s report were better able to identify the 
responsibilities assumed for the financial statements by both management and the 
auditors compared to loan officers who read the old auditor‟s report. 
In the early 1990s, the Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) 
proposed a new wording for their standard auditor‟s report with the issuance of the 
Statement of Auditing Practice (AUP) no. 3, which followed the US example of SAS 
no. 58. Monroe & Woodliff (1994) investigated the effect of the proposed wording 
changes by surveying auditors and various types of users. After establishing the 
existence of the gap under the old form of the auditor‟s report, the researchers found 
that the new version eliminated some of the differences in perceptions (e.g., regarding 
the auditor‟s responsibilities), but also created new differences, especially in areas not 
mentioned in the auditor‟s report (e.g., fraud prevention). Kneer et al. (1996) 
confirmed that the language of the auditor‟s report can influence users‟ perceptions of 
auditors‟ responsibilities and that the improved language in SAS no. 58 “achieved 
modest success in this regard” (p. 25). 
In the UK, Holt & Moizer (1990) studied the auditor‟s report by investigating 
the extent to which auditors and sophisticated users distinguished between various 
reports. Their results indicated disagreement between the two groups concerning the 
unqualified auditor‟s report. This disagreement was related to both the meaning of the 
unqualified auditor‟s report and the interpretation of the qualifications used by 
auditors. In particular, users perceived going-concern qualifications to be more 
serious than did auditors. Miller et al. (1993) found that bankers considered a longer 
report to be more useful and understandable as compared to a short-form report. 
Similarly, the purpose of Hatherly et al.‟s study (1991) was to disentangle whether 
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different meanings were attached to a complete versus short-form unqualified 
auditor‟s report (using a UK derivative of the SAS no. 58 standard auditor‟s report). 
Only a complete auditor‟s report changed readers‟ perceptions. This is consistent with 
Schelluch (1996), who found that the expectation gap regarding auditor 
responsibilities was diminished with the introduction of a complete auditor‟s report. 
However, a complete report did not reduce the expectation gap regarding perceptions 
of financial statement reliability. Innes et al. (1997) concluded that an expanded SAS 
600 report would allow the audit profession to enhance its status without any change 
in actual audit activities or auditor accountability. Similarly, Koh & Woo (1998) 
observed a better understanding of the scope, nature, and significance of the audit 
with a complete report. 
In contrast, recent Australian evidence showed that more detailed descriptions 
of the respective responsibilities did not result in a reduction of the expectation gap, 
whereas placing the audit opinion at the beginning of the report appeared to have 
some beneficial consequences on users‟ perceptions (Chong & Pflugrath 2008). 
Similarly, Brown et al. (1993) found that an expansion of the auditor‟s report actually 
increased the number of differences perceived by users. 
Humphrey et al. (1992) suggest that auditor‟s report changes are a way to 
ensure the audit expectation gap debate is framed in terms of improving the 
understanding of users rather than a consideration of what the role of the audit should 
be or to provide more information on the nature and quality of audit performance. 
Instead of detailing considerations and findings regarding the enterprise as specific 
outcomes of the particular audit, standard setters had moved towards longer-form 
audit reports, where the dominant emphasis was on providing information on 
generalized audit responsibilities. Similarly, Humphrey et al. (2009) conclude that the 
auditor‟s report contains general, standardized statements on the role and limitations 
of the audit, but little information about the specific work undertaken and the findings 
obtained by auditors. These findings call into question whether including such 
generalized statements or explanations in auditor‟s reports in addition to the audit 
opinion may convey any additional value or relevant information for users. 
In conclusion, several prior studies suggest that the presence of explanations in 
an auditor‟s report may lead to a better understanding of the responsibilities of 
management and auditors, as well as the nature, scope, and procedures of an audit 
among users. However, there are also contrasting findings, which suggest that the 
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effect of such explanations may be rather small, dysfunctional, or even absent. These 
findings raise some general doubts about the possibility to affect users‟ perceptions by 
providing explanations in the auditor‟s report. Given that previous findings in this 
respect are mixed, we posit a research question rather than a directional hypothesis to 
examine whether the presence of the explanations in the ISA 700 auditor‟s report 
results in a smaller expectation gap (which could be the case if users pay attention to 
these explanations and if this leads to a shift of their perceptions toward those of 
auditors) as compared to the absence of such explanations, i.e. when a short-form 
opinion-only report is used. The research question is stated in the following three 
parts: 
RQ1a: Does the presence versus absence of the explanations in the 
unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s report result in a smaller difference in 
perceptions between auditors and financial statement users regarding the 
extent to which responsibility for the financial statements is ascribed to the 
auditor? 
RQ1b: Does the presence versus absence of the explanations in the 
unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s report result in a smaller difference in 
perceptions between auditors and financial statement users regarding the 
extent to which responsibility for the financial statements is ascribed to 
management? 
RQ1c: Does the presence versus absence of the explanations in the 
unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s report result in a smaller difference in 
perceptions between auditors and financial statement users regarding the 
extent to which reliability is ascribed to financial statements? 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Research design and participants 
We conducted a full-factorial two (complete unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s report and 
an unqualified opinion-only version of this report) by three (auditors, financial 
analysts, and students) between-subjects experiment with participants from Germany. 
Participating auditors came from one German Big 4 audit firm. Part of the contact 
details of financial analysts was received from the Bloomberg database. Additional 
financial analysts were approached through the German Society of Investment 
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Professionals (DVFA). Finally, students at the Ruhr University Bochum and the 
University of Münster participated in the study. 
3.2 Measurement of the audit expectation gap 
The primary dependent variables measuring the overall audit expectation gap are 
multiple-item constructs adopted from instruments used in prior research (Best et al., 
2001; Gay et al., 1997; Monroe & Woodliff, 1993; Miller et al., 1993; Hatherley et 
al., 1991; Holt & Moizer, 1990; Frank et al., 2001; Kelly & Mohrweis, 1989), which 
assess: 1) the extent to which participants ascribe responsibility for the financial 
statements toward the auditor (auditor responsibility), 2) the extent to which 
participants ascribe responsibility for the financial statements toward management 
(management responsibility), and 3) the extent to which participants ascribe reliability 
to the audited financial statements (reliability). Table 1 illustrates our expectation gap 
belief scales and items. 
<<<Insert Table 1 about here>>> 
3.3 Experimental procedure and manipulations 
The experiment was conducted as a web-based survey. Participants received an 
invitation email that provided a link to the survey. The survey was designed with the 
online survey software Globalpark. This software allows the random distribution of 
two experimental treatments (complete unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s report with 
explanations versus unqualified audit opinion-only version of this report without 
explanations) between participants. The survey was provided in German and 
translated into English for reproduction in the Appendix. 
All participants were asked to read a short description of a (fictitious) stock-
listed company, followed by summarized financial statement information from two 
consecutive years. Following this firm-specific information, all participants were 
shown the auditor‟s report on the financial statements. In the “opinion-only” 
condition, participants only read the auditor‟s opinion, whereas the “complete 
auditor‟s report” condition disclosed the complete text of the ISA 700 auditor‟s report 
(including the opinion). Hence, the difference between the two conditions was the 
presence versus absence of the first part of the text of the ISA 700 auditor‟s report, 
which contains the explanations of the auditor‟s (vis-à-vis management‟s) 
responsibilities and the nature, scope, and procedures of the audit. We use this 
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relatively strong manipulation in order to address the doubts regarding the 
effectiveness of including explanations in the auditor‟s report, which we base on the 
mixed findings in prior research. If the gap between auditors and users remains 
unchanged using a complete ISA 700 auditor‟s report as compared to a mere opinion-
only version, this would be evidence of the ineffectiveness of ISA 700‟s explanations 
beyond the audit opinion.
4
 
Following the case description, participants responded to several sets of 
questions relating to the three expectation gap constructs (see Table 1). Within each 
set, the order of questions was randomized, and the questions were followed by 
manipulation checks and demographic questions.
5
 
4. RESULTS  
4.1 Sample demographics 
Auditors 
We contacted approximately 1,450 Big Four auditors, and a total of 163 auditors 
participated in the experiment (11.24% response rate). The average auditor was 42.1 
years old and had 14.8 years of public accounting experience. Of the sample of 
auditors, 127 (77.9%) were male. There were 29 partners, three directors, 37 senior 
managers, 85 managers, and nine senior staff auditors. We asked all participants from 
                                               
4 We considered a variety of alternative design choices, including the possibility of using the pre-ISA 
700 report instead of the short-form, opinion-only version. We concluded that this possibility was less 
appropriate for two important reasons. First, with such an approach it would have been impossible to 
accurately attribute any effects to the specific underlying drivers, since we would have concurrently 
varied many different factors (because the revision of ISA 700 involved quite a number of different 
wording changes within the explanations section of the auditor‟s report), but not the presence/absence 
of explanations as such that we are interested in (and which is a clear-cut factor). Second, as outlined in 
the literature review, prior research evidence is mixed, suggesting that the effects of explanations may 
be rather small, dysfunctional, or even entirely absent. We wished to address this possibility in our 
research design. If the pre-ISA 700 report had been used as the control condition, finding no effect of 
the new report would not be informative, because this could be attributed to lack of statistical power. 
Should, however, no effect be observed with our current design (which also features explicit 
encouragement of participants to thoroughly read the provided auditor‟s report and control for 
participants‟ reading intensity), we believe this would be strong evidence for a lack of effectiveness of 
the explanations, because the same (differences in) expectations would be achieved without any 
additional information beyond the mere audit opinion. Hence, our design choice allows for more 
informative findings in the case of observing no effects. 
5 After participants moved from one set of questions to a subsequent set, they could not go back and 
change their previous answers. This was important to ensure that answers to the dependent variables 
could not subsequently be changed after having read the manipulation check questions. In addition, 
participants could not go back to the previous page of the auditor‟s report after they were presented 
with the questions. In this way, we ensured that participants reported their true perceptions after having 
been exposed to the auditor‟s report. Otherwise, they would have been able to match their answers to 
the detailed explanations contained in the auditor‟s report, which they might have re-read after 
knowing the questions. 
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the different groups to rate which reputation level they believe the audit profession 
holds. On a scale ranging from 1 (low) to 7 (high), auditors perceived the audit 
profession to hold a fairly high reputation level (μ=5.45). 
Financial analysts 
A total of 868 financial analysts were contacted directly, and 105 financial analysts 
participated in the study (7.14% response rate among the directly contacted analysts).
6
 
The average financial analyst was 38.2 years old and had 13 years of work 
experience. Of the financial analysts, 96 (91.4%) were male. There were 32 security 
analysts, 17 portfolio managers, three fixed-income security analysts, four fixed-
income portfolio managers, six directors of research, four chief investment officers, 
and 37 analysts with other functions. On a scale ranging from 1 (low) to 7 (high), 
financial analysts held relatively high levels of experience with financial reports 
(μ=5.11) and knowledge about financial reporting (μ=4.76), while their knowledge 
about auditing was rather moderate (μ=3.32). Finally, analysts perceived the audit 
profession to hold a reputation level slightly above the mid-point of the scale 
(μ=3.68). 
Students 
Out of 706 students from two German universities, 202 responded to our experimental 
survey and participated in the study (28.61% response rate). The average student was 
24.1 years old and had 0.6 years of general work experience. Of the students, 143 
(70.8%) were male. On a scale ranging from 1 (low) to 7 (high), students had 
moderate overall experience with financial reports (μ=3.56) and knowledge of 
financial reporting (μ=4.24). Knowledge about auditing was moderate as well 
(μ=3.37). Finally, students perceived the audit profession to hold a relatively high 
reputation level (μ=4.87). 
4.2 Manipulation checks 
To verify the effectiveness of the manipulation of the presence versus absence of the 
explanations in the auditor‟s report (i.e., complete auditor‟s report versus opinion-
only), we asked participants two questions after they had completed the experimental 
survey. First, participants were asked about the extent to which they agreed with the 
                                               
6 The number of financial analysts contacted via the German Society of Investment Professionals 
(DVFA) is unknown to us. 
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statement “The auditor‟s report provided in the case materials explicitly described the 
respective responsibilities of management and auditors.” (scale from 1=strongly 
disagree to 7=strongly agree). The overall mean response was 4.81 for the „complete 
report‟ treatment and 2.20 for the „opinion-only‟ treatment. The means are 
significantly different (p<0.01), indicating successful manipulation. The manipulation 
check was also successful when conducted separately for each individual user group 
(i.e., auditors, financial analysts, and students) (largest p=0.000). 
Second, participants were asked about the extent to which they agreed with the 
statement “The auditor‟s report provided in the materials explicitly described the 
scope and principles of the auditor‟s work.” (scale from 1=strongly disagree to 
7=strongly agree). The overall mean response was 4.52 for the „complete report‟ 
treatment and 2.77 for the „opinion-only‟ treatment. The means are significantly 
different (p<0.01), indicating successful manipulation. The manipulation check was 
also successful when conducted separately for each individual user group (largest 
p=0.01). 
4.3 Preliminary testing 
As previously described, we measured three dimensions of the expectation gap, two 
of which assess the perceived responsibility for financial reporting (i.e., the 
management responsibility and auditor responsibility dimensions), while the other 
gauges the perceived reliability of the audited financial statements. An exploratory 
factor analysis using all raw items as input variables was performed to verify whether 
our three underlying theoretical constructs were empirically reproduced as separate 
factors. This analysis indeed supports the existence of three stable constructs:
7
 1) the 
responsibility of the auditor for the financial reporting (auditor responsibility), 2) the 
responsibility of management for the financial reporting (management responsibility), 
and 3) the reliability of the audited financial statements (reliability). Reliability 
analyses reveal high Cronbach‟s alphas (0.85 for auditor responsibility, 0.78 for 
management responsibility, and 0.86 for financial statement reliability), indicating 
that all factors measure the underlying construct with a high degree of consistency. 
Consequently, we tested our hypotheses on the basis of average indices of each of the 
three constructs, rather than using the individual items. 
                                               
7 This outcome is robust using either principal components analysis with varimax rotation that assumes 
uncorrelated factors or maximum-likelihood analysis with promax rotation, which allows the factors to 
be correlated. 
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Furthermore, to reduce the overall experimental error, we included the 
following covariates in our data analyses (i.e., ANCOVAs and post-hoc mean 
comparisons): 1) age, 2) gender, 3) self-reported reading intensity of the financial 
statements, 4) self-reported reading intensity of the auditor‟s report, and 5) perceived 
audit profession reputation.
8, 9
 Even though not all measured variables are associated 
with each of the three dependent constructs (see footnote 9) we include them as 
covariates consistently across all analyses to control as much as possible for the 
potential demographic variability in our responses. Footnotes to the upcoming 
analyses indicate whether exclusion of the covariates modifies the results. As shown, 
when this is the case, the main reported results are more conservative than the 
footnoted results. 
4.4 Hypotheses H1 and H2 
H1 predicts that auditors‟ and financial statement users‟ perceptions about the ISA 
700 auditor‟s report will differ significantly in terms of three dimensions: 1) the 
responsibility ascribed to auditors (H1a), 2) the responsibility ascribed to management 
(H1b), and 3) the reliability ascribed to the audited financial statements (H1c). H2 
suggests that all three differences will be relatively greater between students and 
auditors as compared to financial analysts and auditors. Table 2, 3, and 4 provide 
adjusted means (Panel A), ANCOVAs (Panel B), and post-hoc mean comparisons 
(Panel C) for tests of H1a-c and H2a-c. 
For tests of H1 and H2, we used only those observations that were provided by 
respondents in the treatment condition of the „complete auditor‟s report,‟ thus 
                                               
8 We did not include experience-related variables as potential covariates, because we largely control for 
these attributes by splitting the sample into auditors, financial analysts, and students. 
9 First, age is positively correlated with perceived management responsibility and negatively associated 
with perceived auditor responsibility and financial statement reliability (all p’s<0.01). Second, gender 
is significantly associated with perceived management responsibility (p<0.01), such that men‟s mean 
perception rating is higher (6.63) than women‟s mean rating (6.41). Third, we asked participants how 
intensively they read the financial statements (1=did not read them/skipped them; 2=scanned them/read 
them diagonally; 3=read them fairly thoroughly (word by word/number by number); and 4=read them 
very thoroughly (e.g., several times/tried to memorize)). This measure is not correlated with any of the 
three dependent variables. Fourth, using the same scale, we asked participants how intensively they 
read the auditor‟s report. This measure is positively correlated with the dependent measure of perceived 
management responsibility and negatively correlated with perceived auditor responsibility (both 
p’s<0.05). Finally, we asked participants about their perceived audit profession reputation on a 7-point 
scale (ranging from 1=low to 7=high). This measure is negatively correlated with perceived auditor 
responsibility (p<0.01), positively correlated with perceived management responsibility (p<0.01), and 
negatively correlated with perceived financial statement reliability (p<0.05); hence we control for it in 
all upcoming analyses. 
16 
omitting the „opinion-only‟ data.10 The reasoning behind this design choice is that H1 
and H2 relate to differences in perceptions regarding the report as prescribed by ISA 
700 (i.e., the complete report including the explanations). Upcoming tests of RQ1 (see 
Tables 5, 6, and 7) will incorporate all the responses, i.e. including the data from 
participants in the treatment condition of the „opinion-only‟ version of the report. 
Auditor responsibility (H1a and H2a) 
We conducted an ANCOVA with „group‟ (auditor, financial analyst, and student) as 
the independent variable and the „auditor responsibility‟ index as the dependent 
variable (see Table 2, Panel B). There is a significant difference between user groups 
regarding the responsibility ascribed to auditors (p<0.001). Post-hoc mean 
comparisons (see Table 2, Panel C) reveal that the auditors‟ mean responsibility rating 
of 1.58 is significantly lower than the mean responsibility ratings of both financial 
analysts (4.13) and students (3.99) (p<0.001).
11,12
 These findings clearly support H1a, 
such that users ascribe greater responsibility for the financial statements to auditors, in 
comparison to auditors themselves. Further, the difference in ascribed auditor 
responsibility between students and auditors (Δ=2.41) is statistically equivalent to the 
difference between financial analysts and auditors (Δ=2.55) (difference-in-difference 
not significant; t-statistic=0.50; p=0.31; one-tailed).
13
 As such, the results are not 
consistent with H2a, which predicted that students‟ ratings would differ more from 
auditors‟ ratings than those of financial analysts. 
<<<Insert Table 2 about here>>> 
Management responsibility (H1b and H2b) 
Next, we conducted an ANCOVA with „group‟ as the independent variable and the 
„management responsibility‟ index as the dependent variable (see Table 3, Panel B). 
There is a significant difference between user groups regarding the responsibility 
ascribed to management (p<0.01). Post-hoc mean comparisons reveal that the 
                                               
10 As a result, the number of observations for testing H1 and H2 is 124 for auditors, 39 for financial 
analysts, and 57 for students. 
11 There is no significant difference between the mean ratings provided by financial analysts and 
students (p=0.63). 
12 Results are equivalent when omitting covariates from the ANCOVA model and post-hoc analyses. 
13 When omitting covariates from the difference-in-difference analysis (hence, employing raw means 
rather than adjusted means), the difference between auditors and students (Δ=2.41) is significantly 
smaller than the difference between auditors and financial analysts (Δ=2.74; t-statistic=1.83; p=0.03; 
one-tailed), but since the difference is rather trivial and is only observed in the ANOVA model without 
the control variables, we do not discuss it at further length. 
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auditors‟ mean responsibility rating of 6.76 is not significantly different from the 
mean responsibility rating of financial analysts (6.68; p=0.516) but is significantly 
higher than students‟ mean rating (6.29; p<0.01). The difference between the mean 
responsibility rating of financial analysts and students is also significant (p<0.01).
14
 
These findings partially support H1b in that students (but not financial analysts) 
ascribe lower responsibility to management, in comparison to auditors. The difference 
in ascribed management responsibility between students and auditors (Δ=0.47) is 
significantly greater than the difference between financial analysts and auditors 
(Δ=0.08; t-statistic=3.01; p=0.00; one-tailed).15 
<<<Insert Table 3 about here>>> 
Financial Statement Reliability (H1c and H2c) 
To test Hypotheses H1c and H2c, we conducted an ANCOVA with „group‟ as the 
independent variable and the „financial statement reliability‟ index as the dependent 
variable (see Table 4, Panel B). There is a marginally significant effect of user group 
on financial statement reliability (p<0.10). Post-hoc mean comparisons (see Panel C) 
show that the auditors‟ mean financial statement reliability rating of 3.89 is 
marginally lower than the mean reliability rating provided by students (4.51; p<0.10) 
but is not significantly different from financial analysts‟ mean reliability rating (3.92; 
p=0.922). These findings partially support H1c, such that students (but not financial 
analysts) ascribe greater reliability to audited financial statements than do auditors. 
Again, the results also support H2c, because the difference in perceived financial 
statement reliability between students and auditors (Δ=0.62) is significantly greater 
than the difference between financial analysts and auditors (Δ=0.03; t-statistic=2.10; 
p=0.02; one-tailed).
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4.5 Research question 1: Effect of explanations 
RQ1 examines whether the presence (versus absence) of explanations in the 
unqualified ISA 700 auditor‟s report reduces the difference in perceptions between 
                                               
14 Results are equivalent when omitting covariates from the ANCOVA model and post-hoc analyses, 
with the exception that the difference between auditors and financial analysts is then also marginally 
significant (p<0.10). 
15 Results are equivalent when omitting covariates from the difference-in-difference analysis. 
16 Results are equivalent when omitting covariates from the ANCOVA model, the post-hoc 
comparisons, and the difference-in-difference analysis, with the exception that the significance levels 
for the group main effect (p<0.01) and the difference between auditor and student ratings (p<0.05) are 
greater. 
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auditors and users in terms of responsibility ascribed to the auditor (RQ1a), 
responsibility ascribed to management (RQ1b), and reliability ascribed to the audited 
financial statements (RQ1c). Again, we conducted different ANCOVAs, one for each 
dimension of the expectation gap. However, this time, we added the „opinion-only‟ 
data and included the auditor‟s report type (complete report [i.e. with explanations] 
versus opinion-only report [i.e. without explanations]) as a second factor in each 
model. Tables 5, 6, and 7 present means (adjusted for covariates) and ANCOVAs for 
tests of RQ1. 
Auditor responsibility 
We conducted an ANCOVA with „group‟ (auditor versus financial analyst versus 
student) and „auditor‟s report type‟ (complete report versus opinion-only) as the 
independent variables and the „auditor responsibility‟ index as the dependent variable. 
Table 5 presents the adjusted means per treatment condition (Panel A) and the 
ANCOVA results (Panel B). As shown in Panel B, neither the main effect of the 
auditor‟s report type (p=0.765) nor the interaction effect between group and auditor‟s 
report type (p=0.446) on auditor responsibility ratings are significant. However, non-
tabulated simple mean comparisons of the significant group effect (p=0.000) reveal 
that auditors‟ (adjusted) mean „auditor responsibility‟ rating (1.74) remains 
significantly lower than both financial analysts‟ (4.10) and students‟ mean rating 
(3.93), also when including the „opinion-only‟ treatment data in the study sample 
(both p‟s<0.001).17 In conclusion, our results suggest that the presence (versus 
absence) of explanations in the ISA 700 auditor‟s report does not affect the gap in 
perceptions between auditors and users regarding the auditor‟s responsibility. 
<<<Insert Table 5 about here>>> 
Management responsibility 
Next, we conducted an ANCOVA with „group‟ and „auditor‟s report type‟ as the 
independent variables and the „management responsibility‟ index as the dependent 
variable. Table 6 presents the adjusted means per treatment condition (Panel A) and 
the ANCOVA results (Panel B). Again, the only significant effect is the main effect of 
group (p<0.001), such that auditors rank the level of management‟s responsibility 
marginally higher (6.87) than financial analysts (6.75; p<0.10) and significantly 
                                               
17 Results are equivalent when omitting covariates from the ANCOVA model. 
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higher than students (6.26; p<0.001) do. The main effect of the report type and the 
interaction effect are both insignificant.
18
 In conclusion, our results suggest that the 
presence (versus absence) of explanations in the ISA 700 auditor‟s report does not 
affect the gap in perceptions between auditors and users regarding the management‟s 
responsibility. 
<<<Insert Table 6 about here>>> 
Financial statement reliability 
To examine RQ1c, we conducted an ANCOVA with „group‟ and „auditor‟s report 
type‟ as the independent variables and the „financial statement reliability‟ index as the 
dependent variable. Table 7 reports the adjusted means per treatment condition (Panel 
A) and the ANCOVA results (Panel B). Neither the two main effects nor the 
interaction effect are significant (smallest p=0.346). Hence, the presence (versus 
absence) of the explanations in the ISA 700 auditor‟s report does not bring users‟ 
reliability ratings closer to the auditors‟ ratings.19 
<<<Insert Table 7 about here>>> 
At least to the extent that auditor perceptions can be used as a “benchmark” 
for normative perceptions of management and auditor responsibilities and financial 
statement reliability, our results do not suggest that the presence of the ISA 700 
explanations of management‟s and auditor‟s respective responsibilities and of the 
nature, scope, and procedures of the audit in the complete auditor‟s report affects the 
expectation gap. In contrast, we find a similar gap in perceptions when the complete 
report with its detailed explanations is provided as when a report with the mere audit 
opinion is provided. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Over 70 jurisdictions around the world have adopted the ISAs, and several additional 
implementations are pending, most notably in the EU and China. These developments 
reinforce the need for further empirical evidence on international users‟ perceptions of 
ISA 700, which is one of the most important standards with respect to enhancing 
                                               
18 Results are equivalent when omitting covariates from the ANCOVA model, except that the 
difference between auditors and financial analysts is greater (p<0.05). 
19 When omitting covariates from the ANCOVA model, the group main effect turns significant 
(p=0.001), and non-tabulated mean comparisons reveal that students‟ unadjusted mean (4.31) is 
significantly greater than both auditors‟ unadjusted mean (4.02; p<0.05) and financial analysts‟ 
unadjusted mean (3.77; p<0.001). 
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investors‟ confidence in financial reporting. Given permanent revisions of current 
standards to address changing investor needs, empirical evidence on user perceptions 
is a crucial means of providing insight into possible needs and directions for standard 
revisions. Because individual jurisdictions plan to adopt and build on the existing ISA 
700, such as the EU or national standard-setters, high-quality standards are an 
important condition for consistency and standard-setting transparency. 
Prior research has repeatedly indicated the existence of an expectation gap 
between auditors (who are knowledgeable about the purpose and implications of an 
audit) and users regarding the reliability of audited financial statements and the 
respective responsibilities that managers and auditors assume. This phenomenon has 
been demonstrated across time and national borders, and even despite various 
institutional changes to narrow the gap. Indeed, the revised ISA 700 auditor‟s report 
represents one such attempt. Hence, this study was conducted to empirically assess 
the current state of the expectation gap under the revised ISA 700 by inquiring a 
sample of German auditors and financial statement users. 
Consistent with our prediction, we found that users ascribed far greater 
responsibility for the financial statements to auditors (well above the midpoint of the 
scale) as compared to auditors, who ascribed almost no responsibility to their own 
profession. Although we expected a greater gap between auditors and students when 
compared to the gap between auditors and analysts, the results are not significant in 
this regard. These findings are in line with recent US literature on the audit 
expectation gap, where Reckers et al. (2007) found that auditors‟ attitudes toward the 
public accounting profession were more favourable than those of judges, law students, 
and MBA students, and where Butler et al. (2010) identified important differences 
between auditors‟ and investors‟ perceptions of the intended meanings of key terms 
used to define auditors‟ responsibilities. 
Considering the assessment of management‟s responsibility, we observed a 
gap between auditors and users, which was driven by a somewhat lower rating by the 
group of less experienced financial statement users (students). However, it is 
important to note that all three groups assigned a relatively high level of responsibility 
(all means greater than 6 on a 7-point scale) to management, indicating a clear 
narrowing of the expectation gap in this regard as compared to prior research. Finally, 
with respect to perceived financial statement reliability, all three groups provided a 
moderately high ranking (around 4 on a 7-point scale), though students rated 
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reliability somewhat higher than auditors and analysts. Again, we conclude that the 
gap in this dimension is relatively minor. 
These findings suggest that the audit expectation gap persists but appears to be 
largely driven by discrepant expectations between auditors and users regarding the 
formal responsibilities and abilities of the auditor. However, the gap is smaller with 
regard to management responsibilities and the perceived reliability of audited 
financial statements. 
We further investigated the effect of the explanations provided in the ISA 700 
auditor‟s report by comparing user perceptions based on the complete report that 
contained these explanations versus an opinion-only version that did not. This 
approach allowed us to test whether or not the presence of the explanations mandated 
by the revised ISA 700 would lead to an alignment of users‟ perceptions toward those 
of auditors. Our results suggest that despite the underlying objective of the revised 
ISA 700 auditor‟s report, the presence of the (quite extensive) ISA 700 explanations 
does not affect the expectation gap. 
This study has some limitations that should be acknowledged. First, a 
maintained assumption is that auditors‟ perceptions can be considered a benchmark 
for the normative responsibilities and financial statement reliability. Though auditors 
are likely to have self-interest and may also respond strategically to questions 
regarding their own responsibilities, we suggest that it is plausible to assume that 
auditors are the best profession available to use as a benchmark in this regard, due to 
their in-depth knowledge of the audit process. Indeed, this is a maintained assumption 
in most prior empirical research on the audit expectation gap. Second, our study is 
limited to comparing the perceptions of auditors, financial analysts, and students, and 
we acknowledge that there may be other stakeholders whose perceptions are also 
important to consider.
20
 Finally, to judge whether there has been a true change in 
perceptions, some might argue that the pre-ISA 700 auditor‟s report would be a more 
suitable alternative condition than our opinion-only version of the ISA 700 auditor‟s 
report that excludes all explanations. However, as discussed extensively in footnote 4, 
this alternative design would have involved severe problems and losing the particular 
benefits of our design choice. 
                                               
20 See e.g. Ruhnke et al. (2010) for survey based evidence on general expectations regarding the 
auditor‟s work of some additional stakeholder groups in Germany, including university professors, 
business press journalists, or bank officers. 
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Overall, while the fact that an audit expectation gap still exists under the new 
ISA 700 auditor‟s report is in line with our expectations, it is disconcerting that the 
(quite detailed) explanations of auditor versus management responsibilities and of the 
nature, scope, and procedures of the audit do not favourably affect the gap. This 
observation may indicate that the explanations would need to be formulated more 
explicitly and clearly, or even that user‟ perceptions are not malleable by additional 
explanations in the auditor‟s report. The latter concern is also supported by a recent 
qualitative study by Mock et al. (2011), which similarly suggests that financial 
statement users only consider the actual audit opinion (as long as it is unqualified) as 
the relevant signal but that they disregard the long text of the report and the 
explanations included beyond the opinion itself. This may suggest that wording 
changes are not the solution needed to overcome the expectation gap, possibly 
because users‟ expectations are determined by rather stable preconceptions.21 At this 
stage, however, any specific recommendations are speculative and require further 
research for validation. 
 
                                               
21 For a general discussion on the clarity of audit standards see Dennis (2010a). 
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Table 1 
Expectation Gap Belief Scales 
 
Panel A: Auditor Responsibility Factor (Cronbach‟s alpha = 0.851) 
(all item scales range from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree) 
According to my impression…  
…the auditor is responsible for detecting all fraud 
…the auditor is responsible for the soundness of the internal control structure of the entity. 
…the auditor is responsible for maintaining accounting records. 
…the auditor is responsible for producing the financial statements. 
…the auditor is responsible for preventing fraud. 
Panel B: Management Responsibility Factor (Cronbach‟s alpha = 0.753) 
(all item scales range from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree) 
According to my impression…  
…management is responsible for detecting all fraud. 
…management is responsible for the soundness of the internal control structure of the entity.  
…management is responsible for maintaining accounting records. 
…management is responsible for producing the financial statements. 
…management is responsible for preventing fraud. 
Panel C: Financial Statement Reliability Factor (Cronbach‟s alpha = 0.860) 
(all item scales range from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree) 
Users can have absolute assurance that the financial statements contain no material misstatements. 
The audited financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial position of the entity. 
The entity is free from fraud. 
The audited financial statements comply with accepted accounting practice. 
The audited financial statements contain no deliberate distortions. 
The audited financial statements contain no accidental errors. 
The audited financial statements have no significant omissions. 
The amounts and disclosures contained in the audited financial statements are credible. 
The company has kept proper accounting records during the year. 
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Table 2 
Test of H1a and H2a (Auditor Responsibility Index) 
 
Panel A: Adjusted Means for Auditor Responsibility Index 
 
Group Mean S.E. N 
Auditor 1.58 0.19 71 
Financial Analyst 4.13 0.19 47 
Student 3.99 0.17 95 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Auditor Responsibility Index 
 
 
Source 
Type III Sum  
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F- 
Value 
p- 
value 
Corrected Model 323.61 7 46.23 33.92 0.000 
Group 149.02 2 74.51 54.66 0.000 
Covariates:      
Age 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.99 
Gender 0.54 1 0.54 0.40 0.528 
Self-reported reading 
intensity of financial 
statements 0.79 1 0.79 0.58 0.446 
Self-reported reading 
intensity of auditor‟s 
report 5.65 1 5.65 4.15 0.043 
Perceived audit 
profession reputation 7.02 1 7.02 5.15 0.024 
Error 279.44 205 1.36   
 
Panel C: Post-hoc Mean Comparisons (Least Significant Difference) 
 
   S.E. 
p-
value 
Auditor vs. Financial Analyst 0.25 0.000 
Auditor vs. Student 0.31 0.000 
Financial Analyst vs. Student 0.28 0.626 
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Table 3 
Test of H1b and H2b (Management Responsibility Index) 
 
Panel A: Adjusted Means for Management Responsibility Index 
 
Group Mean S.E. N 
Auditor 6.76 0.09 71 
Financial Analyst 6.68 0.09 47 
Student 6.29 0.08 95 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Management Responsibility Index 
 
 
Source 
Type III Sum  
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F- 
Value 
p- 
value 
Corrected Model 21.75 7 3.11 9.58 0.000 
Group 3.68 2 1.84 5.67 0.004 
Covariates:      
Age 1.01 1 1.01 3.13 0.079 
Gender 0.01 1 0.01 0.02 0.888 
Self-reported reading 
intensity of financial 
statements 0.79 1 0.79 2.43 0.120 
Self-reported reading 
intensity of auditor‟s 
report 0.09 1 0.09 0.28 0.596 
Perceived audit 
profession reputation 1.19 1 1.19 3.66 0.057 
Error      
 
Panel C: Post-hoc Mean Comparisons (Least Significant Difference) 
 
   S.E. 
p-
value 
Auditor vs. Financial Analyst 0.12 0.516 
Auditor vs. Student 0.15 0.002 
Financial Analyst vs. Student 0.14 0.004 
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Table 4 
Test of H1c and H2c (Financial Statement Reliability Index) 
 
Panel A: Adjusted Means for Financial Statement Reliability Index 
 
Group Mean S.E. N 
Auditor 3.89 0.20 71 
Financial Analyst 3.92 0.20 47 
Student 4.51 0.18 95 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Financial Statement Reliability Index 
 
 
Source 
Type III Sum  
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F- 
Value 
p- 
value 
Corrected Model 28.69 7 4.10 2.80 0.008 
Group 6.98 2 3.49 2.38 0.095 
Covariates:      
Age 0.23 1 0.23 0.16 0.692 
Gender 6.99 1 6.99 4.77 0.030 
Self-reported reading 
intensity of financial 
statements 3.30 1 3.30 2.25 0.135 
Self-reported reading 
intensity of auditor‟s 
report 0.06 0 0.06 0.04 0.840 
Perceived audit 
profession reputation 2.20 1 2.20 1.50 0.222 
Error 300.70 205 1.47   
 
Panel C: Post-hoc Mean Comparisons (Least Significant Difference) 
 
   S.E. 
p-
value 
Auditor vs. Financial Analyst 0.26 0.922 
Auditor vs. Student 0.32 0.059 
Financial Analyst vs. Student 0.29 0.043 
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Table 5 
Test of RQ1a (Auditor Responsibility Index) 
 
Panel A: Adjusted Means for Auditor Responsibility Index 
 
Group Report Type Mean S.E. N 
Auditor Opinion-only 1.75 0.14 86 
Complete 1.72 0.16 71 
Overall 1.74 0.12 157 
Financial Analyst Opinion-only 4.03 0.16 56 
Complete 4.17 0.17 47 
Overall 4.10 0.13 103 
Student Opinion-only 4.03 0.14 105 
Complete 3.83 0.14 95 
Overall 3.93 0.11 200 
Overall Opinion-only 3.27 0.08 247 
Complete 3.24 0.08 213 
Overall 3.26 0.06 460 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Auditor Responsibility Index 
 
 
Source 
Type III Sum  
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F- 
Value 
p- 
value 
Corrected Model 719.89 10 71.99 58.17 0.000 
Group 294.67 2 147.34 119.05 0.000 
Report Type .11 1 .11 .09 0.765 
Group x Report Type 2.00 2 1.00 .81 0.446 
Covariates:      
Age 3.64 1 3.64 2.94 0.087 
Gender .60 1 .60 .48 0.487 
Self-reported reading 
intensity of financial 
statements .24 1 .24 .19 0.661 
Self-reported reading 
intensity of auditor‟s 
report 3.19 1 3.19 2.58 0.109 
Perceived audit 
profession reputation 17.25 1 17.25 13.94 0.000 
Error 555.69 449 1.24   
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Table 6 
Test of RQ1b (Management Responsibility Index) 
 
Panel A: Adjusted Means for Management Responsibility Index 
 
Group Report Type Mean S.E. N 
Auditor Opinion-only 6.91 0.07 86 
Complete 6.84 0.07 71 
Overall 6.87 0.06 157 
Financial Analyst Opinion-only 6.81 0.07 56 
Complete 6.69 0.08 47 
Overall 6.75 0.06 103 
Student Opinion-only 6.28 0.06 105 
Complete 6.24 0.06 95 
Overall 6.26 0.05 200 
Overall Opinion-only 6.66 0.03 247 
Complete 6.59 0.04 213 
Overall 6.63 0.03 460 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Management Responsibility Index 
 
 
Source 
Type III Sum  
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F- 
Value 
p- 
value 
Corrected Model 48.69 10 4.87 18.61 0.000 
Group 13.00 2 6.50 24.84 0.000 
Report Type 0.60 1 0.60 2.31 0.130 
Group x Report Type 0.10 2 0.05 0.19 0.826 
Covariates:      
Age 0.16 1 0.16 0.60 0.441 
Gender 1.34 1 1.34 5.12 0.024 
Self-reported reading 
intensity of financial 
statements 0.37 1 0.37 1.43 0.232 
Self-reported reading 
intensity of auditor‟s 
report 0.46 1 0.46 1.74 0.188 
Perceived audit 
profession reputation 0.72 1 0.72 2.76 0.099 
Error 117.50 449 0.26   
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Table 7 
Test of RQ1c (Financial Statement Reliability Index) 
 
Panel A: Adjusted Means for Financial Statement Reliability Index 
 
Group Report Type Mean S.E. N 
Auditor Opinion-only 4.14 0.16 86 
Complete 4.07 0.17 71 
Overall 4.11 0.13 157 
Financial Analyst Opinion-only 3.94 0.18 56 
Complete 3.94 0.19 47 
Overall 3.94 0.14 103 
Student Opinion-only 4.06 0.15 105 
Complete 4.35 0.15 95 
Overall 4.20 0.12 200 
Overall Opinion-only 4.05 0.08 247 
Complete 4.12 0.09 213 
Overall 4.08 0.06 460 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Financial Statement Reliability Index 
 
 
Source 
Type III Sum  
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F- 
Value 
p- 
value 
Corrected Model 33.60 10 3.36 2.23 0.015 
Group 2.95 2 1.48 0.98 0.376 
Report Type 0.55 1 0.55 0.37 0.546 
Group x Report Type 3.20 2 1.60 1.06 0.346 
Covariates:      
Age 2.89 1 2.89 1.92 0.167 
Gender 1.12 1 1.12 0.75 0.388 
Self-reported reading 
intensity of financial 
statements 0.02 1 0.02 0.02 0.902 
Self-reported reading 
intensity of auditor‟s 
report 3.93 1 3.93 2.61 0.107 
Perceived audit 
profession reputation      
Error 676.00 449 1.51   
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APPENDIX 
Experimental Case with Auditor’s Report Manipulation (‘Opinion-only’ Versus 
‘Complete Report’)* 
 
In the following, you will obtain information about Berens Electronics AG and the auditor‟s 
report of its financial statements auditor. Upon reading the case, you will be asked a set of 
questions. 
 
Berens Electronics AG 
Berens Electronics is a large publicly traded company that manufactures and distributes 
audio, video, and other multimedia equipment to retailers throughout Europe. 
 
Berens Electronics has completed the fiscal year 2007 and published the IFRS consolidated 
financial statements, which are outlined in the following: 
 
Berens Electronics AG 
Consolidated Balance Sheet 
 12/31/2007 
in million € 
12/31/2006 
in million € 
Non-Current Assets 600 596 
Current Assets 490 479 
   Thereof cash and cash equivalents 156 150 
   Thereof accounts receivables 191 189 
   Thereof inventory 143 140 
TOTAL ASSETS 1,090 1,075 
   
Equity 640 638 
Liabilities 450 437 
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 1,090 1,075 
 
Berens Electronics AG 
Consolidated Income Statement 
 2007 
in million € 
2006 
in million € 
Sales 1,300 1,181 
Cost and expenses 1,201 1,084 
OPERATING PROFIT 99 97 
Financial income and expenses 2 1 
PROFIT BEFORE TAX 101 98 
 
 
 
Berens Electronics‟ financial statements have been audited by the audit firm G&B for the 
preceding three years. G&B is a large audit firm with a good reputation. 
 
In the following, this year‟s auditor‟s report of G&B relating to the audit of this year‟s IFRS 
consolidated financial statements according to International Standards on Auditing (ISA) is 
reproduced: 
                                               
* The original versions used in this study were in German Here, we provide an English translation. 
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[--- Experimental Manipulation ---] 
[The following text was shown in the ‘complete report’ auditor’s report condition:] 
 
 
Independent Auditor’s Report 
 
To Berens Electronics AG 
 
We have audited the accompanying consolidated financial statements for the year from 
January 1
st
, 2007 to December 31
st
, 2007. 
 
Management’s Responsibility for the Financial Statements 
The management of the company is responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of 
these financial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards as 
adopted by the European Union. This responsibility includes:  
- designing, implementing and maintaining internal controls relevant to the preparation and 
fair presentation of the financial statements, which are to be free from material misstatement, 
whether due to fraud or error;  
- selecting and applying appropriate accounting policies; 
- and making accounting estimates that are reasonable in the circumstances. 
 
Auditor’s Responsibility 
Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the financial statements based on our audit. We 
conducted our audit in accordance with International Standards on Auditing. Those standards 
require that we comply with ethical requirements and plan and perform the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from material misstatement. 
 
An audit involves performing procedures to obtain audit evidence about the amounts and 
disclosures in the financial statements. The procedures selected depend on the auditor‟s 
judgment, including the assessment of the risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to fraud or error. In making these risk assessments, the auditor 
considers internal control relevant to the entity‟s preparation and fair presentation of the 
financial statements to design audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances but 
not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the entity‟s internal 
control. An audit also includes evaluating the appropriateness of accounting policies used and 
the reasonability of accounting estimates made by management as well as evaluating the 
overall presentation of the financial statements. 
 
We believe that the audit evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a 
basis for our audit opinion. 
 
Opinion 
In our opinion, the financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial position of 
Berens Electronics AG, as of December 31
st
, 2007, and of its financial performance and cash 
flows for the year from January 1st, 2007 to December 31st, 2007, in accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards. 
 
G&B 
(Public Accounting Firm) 
 
[---------------------------------------] 
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[The following text was shown in the ‘opinion-only’ auditor’s report condition:] 
 
 
Independent Auditor’s Report 
 
To Berens Electronics AG 
 
We have audited the accompanying consolidated financial statements for the year from 
January 1
st
, 2007 to December 31
st
, 2007. 
 
[…] 
 
Opinion 
In our opinion, the financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial position of 
Berens Electronics AG, as of December 31
st
, 2007 and of its financial performance and cash 
flows for the year from January 1st, 2007 to December 31st, 2007 in accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards. 
 
G&B 
(Public Accounting Firm) 
 
[---------------------------------------] 
 
 
